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EPODUS XVI AND THE ROMAN SIBYLLINA
Epodus XVI occupies a special place in Horatian philology also for 
leverai reasons. In the centre of the interpretations dealing with it we 
sind its relationship to eclogue IV and, in connection with this, also the 
question of priority not clarified up to the present day.1 However, a simi­
larly exciting and unsolved problem is also, whether the poet took 
earnestly the idea of the exodus of the melior pars,2 the existence of the 
Island of the Blessed,3 or is this poem — in connection with which the 
majority of the researchers are inclined to believe that it is one of the 
earliest, if not the very first, Horatian poem preserved to us1 — the 
bitterly ironic precipitation of his despondent state of mind not finding 
a way out and not cherishing illusions as to the future. Thus, the interest 
of the majority of the interpreters was engaged first of all by the second 
great structural unity of the poem. They approached the whole of the 
epodus strating out from this, tried to solve its meaning and to mark out 
its place in the oeuvre of Horace and also in the political general thought 
of the period.5 Much less has been said so far about the introductory part 
of the epodus (vv. 1 — 18) and about its accurate interpretation, although 
— and this must be noted already now — perhaps just this can be the key 
of the solution of the series of questions connected with the whole of the 
epodus.
There is a complete agreement in as much as the direct motive of the 
writing of the epodus must be sought in the critical atmosphere especially 
overcoming Rome after the Perusian war.6 The desperate scream of the 
young poet was evoked by the fact of the civil war flaring up again hardly 
one year after the tragedy of Philippi, viz. :
Altera iam teritur bellis civilibus aetas,
suis et ipsa Roma viribus ruit: (vv. 1 — 2)
that is; already the second generation is perishing in the battlefields of 
the fratricidal war, and that Rome that had survived amidst so many afflic­
tions of history, destroyes herself, that Rome that:
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. . . neque finitim i valuerunt perdere Marsi, 
minacis aut Etrusca Porsenae manus, 
aemula nec virtus Capuae, nec Spartacus acer, 
novisque rebus infidelis Allobrox, 
nec fera caerulea domuit Germania pube
parentibusque abominatus Hannibal,. . .(vv. 3 — 8)
Before the poet-vates future appears as an apocalyptic vision: 
f er isque rursus occupabitur solum, 
barbants he.u cineres insistet victor et urbem 
eques sonante verberabit ungula, 
quaeque carent ventis et solibus ossa Quirini
(nefas videre.) dissipabit insolens, (vv. 9 —14)
That is: the city will again be the den of wild beasts, as it had been in 
olden times, and the barbarian horseman will arrogantly tread on the ashes 
of Rome and disperse the ashes of the ήοως κτίστης, of Romulus. For 
the remaining rnelior pars that opposes to civil war, no other possibility 
will be left for rescue than to follow the example of the Phocaeans (Herodo­
tus 1, 165), to leave Italy by ship to some place, somewhere to the Island 
of the Blessed, because — and this is the final conclusion — the destruction 
of Rome is already definitely inevitable, (v. 15 ff.)
The tone of the introductory lines of the epodus, in accordance with 
the contents, is distracted, and the elaborately confused character of the 
historical picture, the purposely unsystematical enumeration of the enemies 
of Rome are also intended to demonstrate the agitated state of mind of 
the poet. This introduction, however, contains a contradiction of a kind 
that at the first reading remains practically hidden behind the drifting 
stream of the lines. Horace starts the poem, in fact, with the stressing of 
the fatal irresponsibility or, as lie puts it, responsibility of the Romans, 
— suis at the very beginning of the line is from the view-point of the word 
order in a stressed position! —, and he closes his historical survey also 
with the same idea, viz.: impia perdemus devoti sanguinis aetas (v. 9). 
However, following this, without any transition, with a bold changing 
over he strarts the description of the city destroying activity of the bar­
barus. . . victor. . . eques (vv. 11 — 12), from which it becomes clear that 
the d i r e c t  r e a s o n  of the destruction of Rome will not be the civil 
wars, but some external attack made by the barbarians.7
But what is the reason for this extreme pessimism of Horace as regards 
the annihilating barbarian attack that is almost imminent according to 
his description ? We could ask this, and not without any reason. Because 
the fact is that although the civil wars caused a lot of grievances to Italy 
herself and also to others, but first of all to the population living there, 
Rome during the decades of the civil wars — in a paradoxical way — not 
only did not suffer any serious foreign political loss, but exactly it was 
constantly expanding. If we take only the one and a half decades preceding 
the coming into existence of the poem, we find the following position: 
Gaul and Germania were brought by Caesar under Roman supremacy;
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in Egypt people wanted to favour him with the head of Pompey; —the 
Egyptian revolt and its defeat have become a serious action more or lass 
only in Caesar’s dramatizing description — ; a few years later Brutus and 
Cassius could plunder Greece and the western coast of Asia Minor almost 
without any resistance.8 The Hellenistic monarchies and kingdoms coming 
into a forced neighbourhood with the Roman Empire, or even under its 
domination have already long since learned to respect the strength of the 
Roman legions. There was hardly any among them who would have thought 
to take up fight against the expansion of Rome with an earnest chance, 
far from destroying the city itself. Thus, the concretization of the “bar­
barus eques” formulated by Horace in a general sense is far from being 
simple. On the basis of A. Kissling’s commentary that has become classical 
— since at the time of the coming into existence of the poem hardly any 
other external enemy could come into question —, it has become usual 
to identify the victorious barbarian with the Parthians, “auf die auch 
eques hinzuweisen scheint: sie hatten 40/41 Syrien, Phönizien, Palästina 
und Cilicien erobert und drohten ganz Kleinasien Überzufluten: dass sie 
ihre Angriffe noch weiter tragen würden, lag durchaus im Bereich der Mög­
lichkeit.”® But was the Parthian war taking place in 40/41 really so dange­
rous for Rome that such an atmosphere of panic could arise in the centre 
of the empire, or have we rather to do with the hesitation of the commen­
tator, who on account of the reason mentioned above could not resort 
to any other solution?
Parthia, separating from the monstrous empire of the Seleucids, in 
its institutions and mentality following the Achaimenids, and regarding 
itself as the legal sucessor of the former Persian Empire, hut built up in 
many respects after the pattern of the Hellenistic monarchies, under the 
reign of Mithridates I (171 — 138 B. C.) had really developed into the most 
significant power of the East.10 About Mithridates I, who for the first 
time after the Aehaimenid rulers took up again the title of “King of Kings”, 
Th. Mommsen wrote in this connection with justification that: “Die Welt 
wieder hatte zwei Herren.”11 And although this empire was as multi-colour­
ed and multinational as that of the Achaimenids had been earlier, and 
up to the end of the 2nd century was constantly forced to defensive fights 
partly against the Seleucids and partly against the barbarians attacking 
from the north, its existence was a fact with which Rome had to reckon, 
and, of course, the Parthians also had to reckon with the great power 
politics of Rome. Diplomatic relations between the two “great powers” 
were established in 92 that at the same time also means the beginning 
of the official Roman-Parthian relations. At this time Sulla, governor 
in Syria, was visited by Orobazus, envoy of Mithridates II, who offered 
him “alliance and friendship”. The offer was accepted by Sulla and the 
Parthian king became the σύμμαχος καί φίλος that is socius et amicus 
of the Roman people. By this the independent state life of Parthia was 
recognized by the Romans, and at the same time they also agreed that 
the two parties concerned shall regard the Euphrates as the border between 
them ,12
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This first meeting can even be regarded as symbolic from two points 
of view, viz. on the one hand because the Parthian king was the initiator, 
he offered the alliance, and on the other hand, because the factor appears 
already here which was in the strict sense of the word the “water-parting” 
of the Roman-Parthian relations, viz. the observation of the Euphrates 
as the border. The agreement brought about with Sulla, and renewed 
later on several times (in 69 and in 06), remained valid for several decades, 
and the two parties concerned mutually abstained from interfering in 
each other’s internal affairs.13 The Parthian rulers — in contradiction 
to the picture drawn of them later on by Roman propaganda, branding 
them as traitors — sticked to the original convention as long as they 
could.14 In 88 they preserved strict neutrality in the war that broke out 
between the Romans and Mithridates Eupator VI, in spite of the fact 
that Mithridates I I  maintained friendly relations with the Pontian ruler.15 
In 74, at the time of the third war against Mithridates, Lucullus could 
count on the neutrality of the Parthians, who in 73 turned down the 
request of Mithridates VI for help.1® In 70 Phraates III did not accept 
the offer of the Armenian king Tigranes and Mithridates VI towards the 
bringing about of an anti-Roman alliance. Instead of this he rather confirm­
ed the earlier amicitia with Lucullus, who in return in 69 recognized 
again the Euphrates as the border.17 In 66 they acted towards Pompey 
as friendly as towards his earlier predecessor, Lucullus, moreover Phraates 
III, upon the encouragement of Pompey, rendered military help to Tigranes 
the Younger against his father, and provisionally a military alliance came 
about between Pompey and the Parthian ruler. It came again to the 
confirmation of the Roman-Parthian good relations, at this time to the 
renewal of the agreement of 69, although Phraates III, out of caution, 
even now did not press the further development of the “amicitia” into 
a “foedus”.18 The relations, however, continued to remain friendly, and 
things did not come to a crisis between the two parties concerned even 
when Pompey by commanding his legions over the Euphrates on his 
part broke the agreement concluded by him not much earlier.19 After 
the departure of Pompey, the Parthians continued to see in Rome “socius 
et amicus”. This is why Mithridates III pressed by Orodes in 57 could 
turn to Gabinius, propraetor of Syrian, for help.20
The till then peaceful and at times even allied relations were upset 
by the ill-considered adventure of Crassus in 54. The war of Crassus also 
according to Cicero’s judgement took place “n ulla belli causa”, and accord­
ing to the Roman legal concepts it was also a bellum iniustum et impium.21 
It is characteristic that the great king, Orodes, in fact, did not understand 
why the war broke out, and he sent delegates not only to Crassus referring 
to the earlier agreements, but also to Rome to the senate in order to 
clarify, whether they have to do with a private action of Crassus or with 
a military expedition approved by the senate.22 But — and this is again 
characteristic of the attitude of the Parthians — the Romans even after 
the battle of Charrai would have been granted free withdrawal under the 
condition that they would be willing to adher to the earlier agreements.
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Tlie assumption cannot be proved at all that Crassus really was a victim 
of machination.23 It is, however, true that the state of war between Rome 
and Parthia began with this, although this state of war was rather ambiva­
lent. We should not attribute too great significance to the Parthian puni­
tive expedition of 51. In fact, Bibulus, governor of Syria at that time, 
who maintained relations with the Parthian royal court, carried through 
the withdrawal of the attacking troops rather easily, witli simple diplo­
matic maneuvres.21
The noncommittal attitude of the Parthians towards Rome becomes 
clear also from the events of the struggle of Caesar and Pompey, as well as 
of the war of the triumviri and the republicans. Pompey was prevented only 
by his death in 48 from asking the help of the Parthians against Caesar.25 
Caesar’s not quite clear plans20 in connection with the Parthians served 
rather for the cooling down of the internal tension, but — and from our 
standpoint this is most important — in 42 Cassius, whose most secure 
refuge was Syria, turned exactly to the Parthians, he saw in them his 
only, suitably strong potential allies. He sent Labienus the Younger to the 
court of Orodes to carry through for him the armed support of the Parthian 
king. Orodes, however, was afraid to comply with his request. Thus 
before the battle of Philippi the expected rendering of help did not come, 
and the hopes of Cassius were frustrated. Labienus — exploiting the inter­
nal contrasts of the court — could carry through only one year later that 
under the commandership of Pakoros, heir apparent of the throne, a 
Parthian army should cross the Euphrates and attack the eastern provinces 
of Rome.27 However, this attack cannot be valued as a simple Parthian 
invasion. In reality its originator was the republican Labienus, and in the 
course of time the military force of anti-Roman attitude drawing the 
already mentioned provinces under its control was divided into two parts. 
Only one part consisted of Parthians, while the other part, under the 
commandership of Labienus, was recruited from the soldiers of the former 
legions of Cassius stationed in Syria, who had come over from Antonius. 
The two armies were coordinated with each other, but fundamentally they 
carried out independent operational activities.28 That is the attack recorded 
as the “Parthian invasion" is much more to be regarded as one of the attempts 
of the republicans to regain power, instead of seeing in it one of the decisive 
manifestations of the Parthian ambitions for hegemony.
In the relation of epodus XVI all this has a double consequence. 
Horace, the republican “soldier” of 42, who at the time of the writing of 
the epodus belonged exactly to the camp of the disfavoured, of the toler­
ated, could hardly hold the attempt of Labienus for the weakening of the 
power of the triumviri so fatal from the wiew-point of Rome. But even 
if we presumed a sudden conversion about him, the half a century long 
history of the Roman-Parthian relations could not furnish any basis to 
him to gather from an eventual invasion affecting the frontier provinces 
of the empire Parthian world power intentions that would render question­
able the existence of Rome itself. After all, towards Rome the Parthians 
are throughout characterized much more by a defensive than by an
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aggressive attitude. Consequently, the assumption according to which 
at the writing down of the “victor barbarus eques” Horace could presumably 
think about the Parthian conquerors, can certainly be placed among the 
frequently persistently living scientific superstitions.29
Thus, if Horace could not arrive at the formulation of the theorem 
to be found in the introductory part of the poem either under the influence 
of the political situation or by the generalization of the Roman historical 
events, then the origin of the basic idea of the epodus must be sought 
in another sphere.
The according to its serial number first but chronologically second 
letter of Sallust written to Caesar dates from the period directly following 
the battle of Tapsus (46), perhaps still from April of the same year.30 
The letter is made one of the most precious literary monuments of the 
forties not in the first place by its source value regarding the historical 
events, but by the fact that — just like Cicero’s letters — beyond the 
history of the events it furnishes an insight into the atmosphere and 
disposition of the months following the battle of Tapsus. Γη the first 
chapters of the letter Sallust — in a somewhat scholastic style — gives 
advices to the ageing dictator as to what methods he should apply in the 
civil war against the opponents. He stresses the importance of the de­
mentia, and then he changes over to the discussion of the manner of 
peace. He starts his argumentation on behalf of the necessity of the 
creation of peace with the following idea: “De pace firmanda, quoniam 
tute et omnes tui agitatis, primum id, quaeso, considera, quale sit, de quo 
consultas. . . Ego sic existimo: quoniam orta omnia intereunt, qua tempestate 
urbi Romanae fatum excidii adventarit, civis cum ciribus manus conserturos, 
ita defessos et exsanguis regi aut nationi praedae futuros, aliter non orbis 
terrarum neque cunctae gentes conglobatae movere aut contundere queunt, hoc 
imperium.” (Epist. 1.5, 1 — 3)
“In connection with the consolidation of peace, for which yourself 
and all your followers are working, first of all you should consider, please, 
of how great significance it is, what you have taken in your care. . . . My 
opinion is: since everything that has come about will perish, at the time, 
when for the city of Home the destruction ordered by destination has 
come, citizen will clash with citizen, and thus weakened and exhausted 
they will become a prey of some king or people. Otherwise the whole 
world and all the peoples gathering together will not be able to shake 
or crush this empire.”
Thus, the first argument of Sallust can be summed up as follows: 
Caesar must create peace, because the restoration of internal quiet, the 
rendering the peace lasting are the fundamental condition of the preserv­
ation of Rome. The style and the composition are quite typical of Sallust,31 
among other things also because he starts his argumentation with a 
statement of general validity, and starting out from this he expounds 
his say regarding the given situation. In this case, however, the gnomic 
starting and the continuation are not quite successful. In fact, the intro­
ductory argument: “quoniam orta omnia intereunt” and the concluding
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sentence of the idea: “aliter non orbis terrarum neque cunctae qentes conglo­
batae movere aut contundere queunt hoc imperium’’ contain judgements 
excluding one another; because the destruction of Rome will come about 
either with the inexorableness of the natural law equally valid for all 
things that have come into being, and if this is so then nothing can be 
done against it; or it will come about under certain circumstances and 
under certain other circumstances it will not come about. But then the 
first argument is false. The part raising alternative possibilities contrast­
ing to the introductory gnome, fits organically into the train of thoughts 
of the whole of the letter, and at the same time this shows an affinity also 
with the basic idea of epodus XVI. According to Sallust’s letter, if the 
civil war will continue, Rome will perish, and in fact it will fall a prey 
to foreign conquerors. According to Horace already the second genera­
tion is perishing because of the civil war — that is referred to the Perusian 
war, internal strife flared up again —, thus the fate of Rome has been 
sealed, and its conqueror and destroyer, the barbarian horseman, will 
also appear soon. What is mentioned by Sallust as a possibility, that is 
registered by Horace — anticipating events — as an inevitable fact. 
Thus epodus XVI is nothing else than the desperate stating of the taking 
place of one — the worse — of the two possibilities formulated in Sallust’s 
letter.
It has been attempted already by several researchers to solve the 
contradiction of the quoted Sallust passage, to define the genesis of the 
idea, however, without pointing to its organic relation to epodus XVI. 
Certain people hold it fundamentally optimistic, and even gather from 
it confidence in the future of Rome,32 while others regard it as deeply 
pessimistic, and see in it one of the most pregnant formulations of the 
general mood of decadence characteristic of the late republican period,33 
but — similarly to eclogue IV — they also tried to interpret it with the 
influence of the eastern, Jewish —Greek sibyllina,34 and finally — what is 
its most accepted interpretation — they tried to derive it from antece­
dents of Greek philosophy of history, more precisely from the expositions 
of Polybius on philosophy of history.35
It is true that the Roman writers of the late republican age, almost 
without exception, were filled with anxiety about the future of Rome. 
They held their own age the age of decadence, characterized by moral 
depravation and in general by the complete dissolution of the traditional 
Roman scale of values. Lucretius holds himself a child of the fracta aetas, 
in which even nature shows the sign of complete exhaustion, and this 
tendency is equally characteristic öf the living beings and of the inanimate 
world (2, 1150 ff.). As a social person, as a man he feels that he lives as 
a pátriái tempore iniquo (1,41), when his fellow-citizens, driven by craving 
for power and wealth, hire themselves out as “companions and helpers 
of sin” (socios scelerum atque ministros) (3, Gl).36 The judgement of Ca­
tullus on his age is also devastating, expressing hopelessness.37 For Cicero 
the ideal, the golden age of the republic dreamt about by him is not 
meant by the present, but by the 2nd century, and also within that by
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the period of the Scipios, and he is working for the resurrection and revival 
of the spirit of tliis century, at least in principle, in his dialogues relating 
to political science and ethics.38 Sallust’s analysis on the inclinala res 
puhlica, which ex pulcherrima atque opturna prssuma ac flagitiosissima 
facta sit, is also general ly known (Cat. 5,9). At the same time he is the first 
such Roman historian, who recognizes the decline of Roman society as 
a fact, and instead of extenuating the situation, he rather endeavours 
to discover the reason of the decline and to define the time of its beginning.39 
Thus, V. Paschi is partly right when he says: “fast alle Römer, die sich 
mit dem Schicksal Roms befasst haben, unter dem Eindruck stehen, dass 
der Untergang Roms zumindest als Möglichkeit nahegerückt ist.”10 But 
this „Möglichkeit“ in the late republican age was formulated expressis 
verbis only in the two passages quoted by us and in a Cicero oration to be 
mentioned later, thus the demonstration with these leads to tautology. 
On the other hand, the decline is not yet identical with the complete 
destruction taking place with a rapid speed.
The work of Polybius in political science — perhaps just because 
under the conditions of the civil war it was felt by the Romans appropriate 
from many points of view — really did not remain without influence on 
Roman public mentality of the first half of the first century. This applies 
first of all not to his anacyclosis theory but rather to the exposition appea­
ring as an appendix of it, referring back to it, and discussing what can 
be the reason of the destruction of a certain state.'11 The philosopher of 
the Scipio circle, who was an eyewitness and a passive participant of 
the fall of his own country as an active politician, and who at the same 
time was also able to survey the crushing of the Hellenistic states from 
the intellectual height of a Greek cosmopolite, sums up his experiences 
with the somewhat resigned objectivity of the loosing party, who has 
definitively resigned to his being a looser, as follows: ότι μεν ovv πάαι τοις 
οναιν ύπόκειτχι φθορά κχι μετχβολή, σχεδόν ον προσδεϊλόγων. Ικari) γάρ της 
ψνσεως ανάγκη πχρχστήσχι την τοιχντην πίστιν. ΔυοΙν δε τρόπων δντων καί)’ 
ονς φθείρε al) χι πέφυκε πάν γένος πολιτείας, τον μεν εξόϋεν, τον δ’ εν χντοϊς 
φυόμενου, το μεν εκτός ίίστχτον εχειν συμβαίνει την ìθεωρίαν, τά δ’ εξ χυτών, 
τετχγμενην. τί μεν δή πρώτον φύετχι γένος πολιτείας και τι δεύτερον, κχ'ιπώς 
είς ίίλληλα μετχπίπτωσιν, εΐρητχι πράοι)εν ημΐν. ώστε τους δννχμένουζ τάς 
άρχάς τώ τελεί συνάπτειν της ένεστώσης νποϋέσεως, καν a ντους ήδη προει- 
πέΐν υπέρ τον μέλλοντος (6,57, 1—4). In the history of every state — he 
continues — three periods can be distinguished, viz. : the period of develop­
ment, the period of flourishing and the period of decline. However, 
the άκμή according to the interpretation of Polybius is only a seeming 
golden age, because at the same time this also means the first phase of the 
regularly starting decline. In fact, after a state has acquired great power, 
the internal destructive forces immediately come into action, viz.: life 
becomes more and more luxurious, the citizens want greater and greater 
power. As this double process is advancing, the symptoms of crisis become 
more and more conspicuous. The evident decline starts with the excessive 
increase of craving for power ( άρξει μεν τής επί το χείρον μεταβολής ή
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φΰ.αρχία), then this is followed by the becoming of the way of living 
more and more ostentatious and more and more luxurious (προς δέ τοντοις 
ή περί τούς βίους αλαζονεία, καί πολυτελεία.). Under the influence of 
this the masses become to feel deceived and they believe that they were 
deceived by those, who earlier had flattered them in order to acquire 
more and more power and wealth. The masses want a change at all costs, 
but at this time they do not only demand equal rights with those holding 
the power, but everything. And if this has taken place: των μεν ονομάτων 
τό κάλ/αστον ή πολιτεία μετάλήψεται, την ελευθερίαν καί δημοκρατίαν, των 
δέ πραγμάτων τό χείριστον, την οχλοκρατίαν (6, 57, 4 —10).
It is not difficult to discover the echo of the moralizing philosophy 
of history of Polybius in the almost indispensable topoi of the contemporary 
literature chastising the society of the first century Rome because of the 
luxuria, the avaritia, the superbia, the ambitio mala, the honoris (caeca) 
cupido ( πολυτελεία, πλεονεξία, αλαζονεία, φ ι λ α ρ χ ί α Moreover, with 
Sallust also the chronological order of the appearance of the symptoms 
of decline agrees with that of Polybius, viz. : Sed primo magis ambitio 
quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat... (Cat. 11, 1). However, the 
train of thoughs of the quoted passage of the Sallust letter and epodus 
XVI at least in two points differs basically from the lucubrations of the 
Greek philosopher. Polybius definitely separates the unforeseen, incalcul­
able breakdown taking place on account of outer reasons and the decline 
starting as a result of internal reasons. The former cannot be foretold, 
because it is accidental, while the latter, because it is governed by definite 
rules, can be foretold. Sallust and Horace, however, establish a causality 
between the two.
Polybius does not speak about civil war, but only about the “rule 
of the mob”, as democracy is called by him. At the same time Sallust and 
Horace speak distinctly about civil war.
Parallelly with the expansion of Rome, but especially as from the 
seventies of the first century, those oracles, especially in the East, became 
more frequent that foretold the fall of Rome.43 The oracle literature of 
the East having a great past and rich traditions became this way one of 
the significant means of the ideological fight against Rome. The monu­
ments of this “intellectual resistance” accessible up to the present time 
have been preserved by the parts of the collection Oracula Sibyllina ori­
ginating from a period before our era.44 The oracles originating especially 
from Hellenistic Jews console their contemporaries seeing no real way 
out from subjugation with the future sinking of the proud Rome into 
servitude as a result of divine will. Time will come, they say, when:
όππόσα δασμοψόρου ’Ασίης νποδεξατο 'Ρώμη,
χρήματά κεν τρις δεδέξεται εμπα.λιν ’Ααίς
εκ 'Ρώμης, όλοήν άποτίσεται νβριν ες αυτήν.
δσσοι δ’ εξ ’ Ααίης ’Ιταλών δόμον άμφεπό/.ευσαν,
είκοσάκις τοσσοϋτοι εν ’ Ασίδι ϋητεύσουσιν
’Ιταλοί εν πενίη, άνά μύρια δ’ όψλήσουσιν. (3, 349 — 354.)
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In one the passages of the collection even the idea akin to that of Horace 
appears, viz.: Rome will again he overcome by wild beasts, and the city 
will disappear from the surface of the world as it had never existed:
r} ξει noi пот’ avordev ï ο η, ύψαύχενε 'Ρώμη, 
ουράνιος πληγή . . .  (8, 37 — 38.)
. . . και πλούτος όλεϊται,
κα,'ι τα δε μέλια. λύκοι και άλώπεκες οΐκήσουσιν,
και τότ έση πανέρημος δ/χος, ώς μή γεγοννϊα. (8, 40 — 43.)
The knowledge of the oracle literature conceived in this mentality 
can be demonstrated in the imperial age and even by the end 
of the imperial age. It was known to Lactantius that according to certain 
oracles in due the power of Rome dominating the world will again pass 
to the East, and the West will be the slave of the East: imperium in Asiam 
revertetur et rursus oriens dominabitur (Div. inst. 7,13, 11). Tacitus indicates 
much more concretely than this, what we must understand by oriens. 
When Vespasian besieged Hierosolyma, according to the tradition the 
siege was accompanied by prodigies, and one of these was that the gods 
left the temple. However, this was not interpreted by the Jews as an 
evil, because their majority were convinced that according to the ancient 
priestly writings exactly at this time fore, ut valesceret oriens el profecti 
luileae rerum potirentur (Hist. 5,13; Suet, Vesp. 4). Thus, quite exactly 
ludea will be the establisher and lord of the new empire extending over 
the world. Iosephus Flavius also traced back the fanatic resistance of 
the Jews to the circumstance that there was an oracle according to which 
they are the reversioners of the domination of the world (Bell. Iud. 6, 5, 3).45
Thus, the basic idea of the Sallust letter and epodus XVI cannot be 
derived from the Jewish-Greek Sibylla oracle either. These oracles, on the 
one hand, foretell with full surety the coming fall of Rome, and do not 
leave any alternative for her, and on the other hand, they explain her 
destruction — in accordance with the spirit of the Old Testament — with 
the divine will. In this case even the already mentioned agreement of the 
motives cannot be decisive. In fact, the complete depopulation of the 
city as a menace is a commonplace of oracle literature. Besides the Sibylla 
oracle (8.41—42), Bakis oracle (Aristoph. Av. 9G7 foil.) and the Jeremiah 
parallel (50,59)'6 let us mention here the similar passage of the so called 
Potter’s oracle originating from the Hellenistic Egypt, viz.: rj re. nana - 
ϋαλάσσιος πόλις ψνγμδς ά/,ιέοιν έσται διά /  το τον ' Α γαϋόν δαίμονα καί 
Κνήψιν εις Μέμφιν πεπορεϋσϋαι, ώστε τινάς διερχομένονς . . .  λέγειν . . . 
Otherwise, the Potter’s oracle originates from the circles of the Egyptian 
priesthood anti-Greek at heart, it has nothing to do with the Jewish-Greek 
sibyllina.47
Thus, none of the attempts made so far towards the interpretation 
of the passage of the Sallust letter has led to a convincing result. Inspite 
of this — in our opinion — still those got nearest to the truth, who have
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brought the idea found liere as well as the basic idea of epodus XVI into 
connection with the contemporary oracle literature.48 It is true that the 
introductory gnome of the passage of the letter — orta omnia intereunt — is 
such a commonplace of Greek philosophy of history that explicitly or 
implicitly can be found in the fragments of the pre-Socratic philosophers 
just as well49 as, formulated as a natural law, in the writings on political 
science of Plato, Aristotle, or even Polybius,5” however, apart from this 
one sentence, the Sallust quotation has an oracle character from the view­
point of both the style and the content. This is indicated first of all by 
the formulation in future tense, viz.: a d v e n t a r i t  (fut. perf.), civis.. . 
manus c o n s e r t u r o s ,  praedae f u t u r o  s; the obscurity as regards 
the indication of the external enemy (regi a и t nationi); and it is also 
likely that the oracle epitomized by Sallust originally was written in 
Greek, in a metric form. In fact the adjectival indication of place urbi 
Romanae instead of the Latinistic urbi Romae is undoubtedly a Graecism 
(πτόλι 'Ρωμ<χ.ίγι) its use is alien to the Latin language, and in the oeuvre 
of Sallust, otherwise inclined to mannerisms, it occurs only here.51 And if 
we translate into Greek the phrase fatum excidii sounding slightly strange 
in Latin, or the phrase qua tempestate adventarit characteristic from another
point of view, we get such expressions ( «.Ισα. όλέϋηου, ( — U U | ---- ) and
a/X όποιαν δε ΐκρ . . .  ( — U U | — U U | — )) that can easily be fitted into 
the hexameter, and at the same time they belong among the recurrent 
locutions of the sibyllina.
The inference resulting from the stylistic marks seems to be confirmed 
also by the content. The eschatologie oracle literature of eastern origin 
holds the degeneration of the family relations one of the main criteria of 
the last times. This motive can be found in the Mahãbhãrata (3, 13 009 
foil.), in the Bahman Vast (2, 30), in Hesiod’s Erga (182—185), later in 
the Prophecies of similar character of the gospels (thus for example Mark 
13,12), in the sibyllina, and in the apocryphal writings, as a topos hardly 
showing any variations.52 This is used by Catullus — first in Rome — to 
characterize his own age arriving at the nadir of moral depravation:
perfudere manus fraterno sanguine fratres,
destitit extinctos gnatus lugere parentes,
optavit genitor primaevi funera nati. .. (64, 399 — 401.)
In the Roman conception, which held the “patricide”, the “murder of a 
relative” and the “murder of a fellow-citizen” equally parricidium, the 
ethical norms characteristic of the family and the categories of social 
morals were closely intertwined already from the very beginning. Thus, 
the civil war is not a simple war, but according to the Roman view it is 
such a fight in which brothers are killing one another. (See the parable of 
Romulus and Remus in epodus VII!) Thus, the oracle occurring with 
Sallust in itself as regards its content is nothing else than one of the variants 
of the eschatologie prophesies, which applies one of the generally known 
topoi of this genre just fitting to the Roman society of the age to charac-
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terize the conditions of the period marked as eschatos from the view-point 
of Rome.
Now the only question is to which layer of the first century oracle 
literature does the oracle appearing as the argument of Sallust belong? 
Besides the official Sibylla books being under the supervision of the cor­
poration named quindecemviri, in Rome of the late imperial age the non­
official libri fatidici sprang up like mushrooms. These borrowed partly 
from the Etruscan saeculum-theory, and partly were of eastern inspiration, 
and out of their oracles not only Marius, Catilina and Caesar, but also 
the triumviri, thus also M. Antonius, endeavoured to make political 
capital.53 After the consolidation of the principáte, these oracles were 
caused to be gathered by Augustus. He had them examined and burnt 
because of their being harmful to the stale reason. Tradition has it that 
in 23 about two thousand such books became the prey of flames (Suet. 
Aug. 94.3).51 I t is not likely, however that the oracle to be read in Sallust 
would have been in any of the books doomed to destruction. In fact, this 
could offer almost automatically the possibility of an advantageous 
actualization for Augustus, for that Augustus, who in the enumeration 
of his deeds mentions with emphasis that he has stopped the civil wars 
(postquam bella civilia exlinxeram, Mon. Ane. 34, c.), that is, who has reali­
zed what two decades earlier Sallust had set as an object before his dicta­
tor predecessor, by this deed — according to the oracle — he became the 
rescuer of the empirò and the guarantor of its integrity. As a matter of 
fact, the Sallust oracle, just on account of its double-faced and alternative 
character, is not unambigously pessimistic as to the future of Rome, 
but the eternal existence of the city can just as well gathered from it as 
its fatally rapid destruction. And this is the feature that renders possible 
the closer definition of its origin and its connections.
We know only one piece of the official Roman Sibylla collection through 
the good offices of Zosimus. Zosimus, analysing the reasons of the decli­
ne of the Roman Empire, quotes at a place (2, 6) the prescription regarding 
the arrangement of the centennial festivals, and he also expounds that 
according to tradition to what the origin of the ceremonies and games 
of the festivals can be traced back. According to this in the 502nd year 
after the foundation of the city (252.) Romo was afflicted by war and epi­
demic. The senate did not find a better solution than to try to find a 
remedy for the troubles with the help of the Sibylla books, and entrusted 
the corporation, at that time still consisting of ten members, to revise 
the oracles. According to the oracles they could only hope the cessation 
of the troubles, if in every hundred and tenth year they offer a sacrifice 
to Hades and Persephone under adequate circumstances. After they 
fulfilled the prescriptions in the year of the fourth consulship of Marcus 
Popilius, the troubles really came to an end. Later this festival was buried 
in oblivion, while at last it was revived by Augustus in 17 and it was 
again arranged by him under luxurious circumstances under the title 
“ludi saeculares”.55 The sibyllinum referring to this quoted by Zosimus 
is closed by the following lines:
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Τα,ϋτά τοι εν ψοεσί afjaiv αεί μεμνημένος εΐνχι,
κχί σοι πάσα χΰών Ίτα,/.ή καί πασα Aocrívojv
crièv υπό σκήπτροισιν επα.νχένιον ζυγόν εξει. (35 — 37.)
Then Zosimus continues liis commentary as follows: “Thus, as the oracle 
says, and as it is also in reality, as long as all this was carried out in accordance 
with the prescriptions, the Roman Empire was intact, and practically 
the whole world known today was kept under its rule. But after Diocletian 
abdicated the imperial throne, and the festivals Avere neglected, slowly 
also the empire declined, and mostly almost unobserved became barba­
rous. . . . The hundred and ten years period elapsed under the time of the 
third consulship of Constantius and Licinius, when in accordance with the 
traditions the festival ought to have been arranged. However, since they 
did not adher to the prescriptions, it was regular that things had to come 
into the deplorable state pressing us at present” (Zosimus, 2, 4 —7.).56
It is immaterial for us at present, whether the oracle — whose details 
otherwise can also be found in the fragments of Phlegon of Tralles (Maerob. 
6) — was caused by Augustus to be faked into the Roman Sibylla collec­
tion.57 If so, even then the faker had to prepare his fabrication on the 
basis of the original collection, in a spirit corresponding to it, and as it 
is betrayed by the mentioning of the Italicus question no longer timely 
in the period of Augustus, he utilized also earlier details to the composition. 
It is essential, however, that also this oracle, just like that of the Sallust 
letter, formulates facultatively, in alternatives, viz.: If the festivity will 
be arranged in every hundred and tenth year, the hegemony of Rome 
will remain uninjured, if, however, it will be neglected, Rome will decline 
and — quoting Zosimus — will become barbarous. Thus, in regard to the 
composition and also from the view-point that here we have also to do 
with the great power position of Rome, there is definitely an affinity 
between the two oracles.
The civil war as a problem of existence, of course, could not be a 
constituting element of that “original” sibyllum collection that presumably 
was brought to Rome still in the period of Tarquin Superbus, since at 
that time this motive and the view of empire still would not have any 
actuality. On the other hand, it is all the more imaginable that in the 
official collection of the forties already both motives played an important 
role, and this modification and change can comparatively easily be explain­
ed with the history of the Sibylla books. In the concluding phase of the 
civil war of Marius and Sulla, at the time of the fire in the Capitol in the 
year 83 presumably also the Sibylla books Avere annihilated. At this time 
the senate set up a separate committee and entrusted them with the tracing 
and collecting again of the original texts of the sibyllina. The members 
of the committe carried out their collecting Avork mainly in Erythrai, 
and brought along with them from there those oracle that thereafter 
Avere placed and preserved in the rebuilt Palatine Apollo temple.58 The 
pieces of the new collection and the details of their compilation are not 
knoAvn, but a feAv self-evident things must be presumed about them, viz.:
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— they could not he anti-Roman,
— in their style they had to adjust themselves to the original 
sibyllina,
— as regards their contents they could not be identical with 
the original (even if eventually there were overlappings 
among them), but they were refreshed in many respects, 
and were adjusted to the changed historical circumstances.
Very likely that oracle was also included among the official sibyllina, 
whose summary has been preserved in Sallust’s letter, and with whose 
formulation its unknown author or authors fulfilled three expectations, 
viz. :
— making the civil war a question of vital importance of Rome, 
they touched the greatest problem of the Romans that 
occupied the intellectual élite of the age more and more 
intensively;
— exposing the problem in the style of eschatology, they succeed­
ed to preserve the appearance of authenticity;
— with their alternative formulation, on the one hand, they 
remained true to the original Roman sibyllina, and on the 
other hand — positively from the view-point of Rome — they 
re-interpreted the oracles of the age foretelling the fall of 
Rome in a sense that for the case of the termination of the 
civil wars they promised eternal life to it.
At any rate, the idea that the etern ity of Rome is the f  unction of internal 
order and quiet, appears first in Roman literature only one decade after 
thecomingof the new Sibylla books to Rome (73.), in Cicero’s Rabirius ora­
tion (63.B. C.), viz,·.“ si hanc civitatem aeternam esse voltis, si aeternum nobis 
imperium,. . . nobis. . . a turbulentis hominibus et rerum novarum cupidis, 
ab intestinis malis, a domesticis consiliis est cavendum" (Pro Rab. 33.).59 
Thus, this official Roman sibyllium preserved in the Sallust letter could 
also be the source of the basic idea of epodus XVI.
Accepting this, on the one hand, the pessimism of the epodus seemingly 
appearing obscure becomes clearer and more intelligible, and on the other 
hand, its relationship with eclogue IV also becomes clearer and more 
intelligible. At the time of the outbreak of the Perusian war Horace 
projected the presumably definite final disaster of Rome referring to the 
official Sibylla books. After the conclusion of the peace of Brundisium, 
Vergil — similarly referring to oracles, however, not to Roman ones, but 
to eastern Jewish prophesies conceived in the spirit of messianistic expect­
ations — foretold the arrival of the golden age peace of cosmic dimensions, 
the realization of everything that Horace believed to be attainable only 
in the utopistic Island of the Blessed. This way epodus XVI and eclogue 
IV are the first aemulatio between the two future leading personalities 
of the golden age literature, whose friendly competition according to these 
had started still before they got into personal contact with one another.
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